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Abstract: Policymakers interested in improving the productivity and profitability of smallholder farmers in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia need to understand what prevents farmers from adopting technologies and 
effectively accessing markets. We summarize recent experimental evidence on constraints to agricultural 
technology adoption among smallholder farmers in these regions. The evidence presented builds from a series of 
policy insight summaries produced by the Agricultural Technology Adoption Initiative (ATAI)1. The underlying 
studies have been selected (and in many cases funded) by ATAI because they provide evidence using randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) to understand and improve the low take-up of agricultural technology in the developing 
world. These summaries have been structured intellectually by the economic constraint they seek to address, and 
we present here the four constraints that have seen the largest amount of experimental work in recent years: 
credit and savings; risk; information; and input and output markets. In the sections that follow, we briefly 
motivate the role of each specific constraint, provide a summary of the recent experimental evidence and key 
outstanding questions, and work to draw a series of conclusions relevant for agricultural policy and practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
1 The authors support and lead the work of the Agricultural Technology Adoption Initiative (ATAI). ATAI is a consortium of affiliated 
researchers conducting field experiments that have been competitively selected and jointly managed by the Center for Effective Global 
Action (CEGA) at the University of California, Berkeley and the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) at MIT. Since its 
inception, ATAI has facilitated more than fifty rigorous evaluations, the majority full-scale randomized controlled trials, addressing 
constraints to the adoption and profitable use of agricultural technology by smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
through support from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, UK Aid from the British people, and an anonymous donor. Building on a 
synthesis of ATAI and related research findings, we gratefully acknowledge the broader ATAI leadership and staff, as well formative 
contributions from those involved in the founding of ATAI including Alain de Janvry, Rachel Glennerster, Kelsey Jack, Benjamin Jaques-
Leslie, Ellie Turner and Chris Udry. Any errors are our own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Randomized evaluations of the agronomic productivity gains from new crops or agricultural techniques have been 
common in the agricultural field for many years. More recent is an approach to agriculture that aims to conduct 
‘effectiveness’ trials, incorporating real-world issues of access and adoption among smallholder farmers, rather 
than the idealized ‘efficacy’ trials produced using experimental test plots. Tackling the impacts of agricultural 
interventions outside of the test plot introduces issues at the heart of economics, such as transaction costs, social 
interactions, marketing, finance, and contracting as we think carefully about the decision to adopt. Thinking of 
the smallholder farm as a small business, this decision should be driven by profitability.  
 
The core contribution of RCTs is their ability to clearly trace causality between the constraints to agricultural 
technology adoption, adoption itself (e.g. of seeds, fertilizers, training, etc.) and final outcomes (e.g. individual 
yields, nutrition, and profitability). Randomized experimental evaluations allow researchers to isolate the causal 
impact of a program from other confounding factors—such as price, weather, or access to credit—which are 
simultaneously changing over time and across regions (See the figure below providing a basic overview of 
randomization as a tool to measure the causal effects of interventions)2. Carefully designed experiments allow us 
to identify whether specific constraints to adoption are binding, and measure the impacts of a technology when 
adopted in farmers’ actual fields. These evaluations speak to the effectiveness of specific approaches to achieving 
agricultural technology adoption for improved smallholder productivity and welfare.3   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The Agricultural Technology Adoption Initiative (ATAI) was founded in 2009 to increase the quantity and quality 
of experimental evidence in developing-country agriculture4. ATAI aims to serve as a mechanism to generate, 
aggregate, and summarize research for policy outreach on the adoption of agricultural innovations by 
smallholders in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. ATAI exclusively funds randomized controlled trials, and 
pilot work that lays the groundwork for future RCTs, and was organized intellectually around understanding how 
a set of specific constraints held back technology adoption. Because of this methodological focus, the resulting 
evidence is primarily on interventions targeted at the individual or household level, although we also report on 
                                                             
2 For more information on the appropriate design and use of randomized evaluations, we recommend J-PAL’s Introduction to Evaluations 
found at https://www.povertyactionlab.org/research-resources/introduction-evaluations, and for a discussion of the contributions of 
randomized evaluations to development economics research and policy, see (Banerjee et al. 2016) 
3 Further discussion is presented in “Field Experiments in Developing Country Agriculture” (de Janvry, Sadoulet, Suri 2016) 
4 ATAI has funded a series of research grant competitions among our affiliates, made possible by generous support from the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, UK Aid from the British people, and an anonymous donor. 
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studies in areas such as input and output markets that attempt to drive outcomes at more aggregated levels. Even 
within this domain, we have a distribution of studies that is purposive, driven by the questions asked by our 
affiliated investigators, and by the technical feasibility of running randomized trials. We use the structure of the 
ATAI constraints to adoption to help summarize the experimental evidence, aggregating individual, internally 
valid studies around these common themes. This produces an evidence base that is far from comprehensive in 
terms of the important issues in agricultural development, but is broader than would have been produced by a 
more tightly structured replication-focused research initiative and does provide a relatively clear guide to what 
makes specific interventions attractive in terms of evidence-based funding.  
 
THE ‘PUZZLE’ OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
 
Throughout the world, 63% of those living under 
$1.25 per day are working in agriculture (see “Figure 
7” at right extracted from Olinto et al. 2013). 
Improving agricultural production and profits is an 
important component of poverty alleviation. Ligon and 
Sadoulet (2017) show the importance of economic 
growth in the agriculture sector for the livelihoods of 
the poorest households: a one percent growth in GDP 
that originates from agriculture correlates with a 5.6 
percentage point increase in expenditures among the 
poorest decile of the population, a 4.45 percentage 
point increase for the bottom 30%, while “growth 
from non-agriculture sectors does not appear to have a 
significant effect on expenditure growth for the 
poorest 50%.” 
 
The Green Revolution of the 1960s saw 
the spread of agricultural technologies 
to less industrialized nations, and large 
agricultural productivity gains 
particularly in East Asia. Yet 
technological innovations have not 
similarly spread to transform 
agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and parts of South Asia as evident 
in the lagging adoption of modern 
varieties (see Tables 8.1, 8.2 and Figure 
8.3 below from the IFAD Rural 
Development Report 2016) and a 
persistent yield gap between regions. 
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Many African countries have rising private 
sectors developing agricultural 
technologies, and research and 
implementation groups including the 
CGIAR centers and AGRA continue to 
develop improved inputs and 
interventions designed to improve the 
resilience, profits, and nutrition of 
African smallholders in particular. Yet 
these innovations do not appear to have 
translated into meaningful improvements 
in yields at the macro-level. FAOSTAT 
data shows a large gap between low per 
hectare cereal yields in Africa and South 
Asia which are on average roughly one 
third of the per hectare yields in East Asia 
and OECD countries.  
Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly 
lagging behind. In South Asia, land 
use for cereal production has 
increased 20% while yields have 
tripled. In Sub-Saharan Africa, land 
use for cereal production has more 
than doubled, while yields have 
increased by just 80% (World Bank, 
2017 - Land under cereal production 
index). The macro picture of 
fertilizer use over time similarly 
looks unchanged, with low and 
stagnant use of fertilizers in mainly 
rainfed areas like Sub-
Saharan Africa. Fertilizer 
consumption remains 
extremely low in Sub-
Saharan Africa compared 
to other regions. Roughly 
16 kilos of fertilizer are 
used per hectare in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and among 
all developing countries 
the average is 26.75 
kg/hectare. This figure is 
much higher in other 
regions: 344 kg/hectare in 
East Asia/Pacific, and 159 
kg/hectare in South Asia.  
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This clearly demonstrates that the status quo of agricultural production, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
remains far below the technological frontier, suggesting missed potential in terms of yields, income, and welfare 
improvements to food security and nutrition. The specific reasons behind lagging adoption of productivity-
enhancing technological innovations and persistent yield gaps in rainfed Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
relative to the rest of the world have been a puzzle in need of policy solutions. 
 
Field experiments help us move beyond test plots to explain the continuing puzzle of low technology adoption by 
smallholder farmers in rainfed areas where agriculture is performing well below the technological frontier. 
Focusing at the microeconomic level of this challenge, we focus on technology adoption as an outcome that 
inherently requires smallholder farmers to change their practices. Behavior changes can include, for example, the 
adoption of resilient and high-yielding crop varieties or a shift to high-value crops, the purchase and application of 
complementary inputs such as fertilizers, and the adjustment of farm labor allocated toward specific agronomic 
practices. 
 
Many smallholder farmers face barriers to adopting effective agricultural technologies. These constraints to 
adoption may be driven by standard economic factors (such as prices or availability), or may be behavioral (driven 
by dimensions such as time inconsistency or ambiguity aversion). 
 
Standard economic explanations consider smallholder farmers as economic agents, building from the conception 
that “in a well-functioning economy where markets perfectly capture all costs and benefits, and individuals are 
fully informed and unconstrained, farmers will adopt a technology if they make a profit from adopting it” (Jack 
2013). This is an important distinction from a world where farmers focus their efforts to maximize their 
productivity, for example, their crop yields, given increased yields do not necessarily lead to improved welfare. 
Profitability can be limited by input costs, credit constraints, and market access. Information and labor 
constraints are also relevant -- how well do farmers understand the properties of new technologies, in the 
absence of opportunities to experiment? What are the additional labor requirements for the use of these new 
technologies, and how do farmers value their time in input decisions? Jack (2013) reviews in detail other 
dimensions that mediate whether certain technologies “meet the expected profitability condition” for specific 
farmers. This varies temporally (prices, weather realizations, and other shocks) and spatially (soil chemistry, 
microclimates, and distances from urban centers). This also varies between and within households, particularly 
when complementary asset or capital investments are needed, or new technologies challenge individual tastes and 
preferences. 
 
Even where markets are functioning well, accessible and profitable technologies may not be adopted for 
behavioral reasons, such as risk or uncertainty aversion or procrastination, which challenge decision-making even 
in the best of circumstances. Smallholders’ decision-making is highly complex and conducted in risky and low 
resource environments. Farmers make interconnected choices over long timeframes that are characterized by 
risks and uncertainty. One of many choices is among a range of potential inputs to production (crop choice, seed, 
labor, fertilizer, etc.), in contexts with highly variable land, wide ranging and seasonal climatic variation that is 
growing increasingly extreme given climate change, and unpredictable shocks to their livelihood. New 
technologies may change the risk or payoff profiles of farming in ways that require us to incorporate other social 
science insights, for example expected utility theory and behavioral economics, in order to understand perceived 
benefits at the farmer level. 
 
Motivated by addressing the constraints hindering the adoption of new agricultural technologies, ATAI has 
worked to fund and structure the experimental evidence base across seven primary market inefficiencies that 
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constrain adoption. These are (1) credit5, (2) risk, (3) information, (4) input and output markets, (5) labor and 
(6) land market inefficiencies, as well as (7) externalities (see Jack, 2013 for a more detailed summary). These 
may operate through supply or demand channels, for example by limiting the availability of technologies, 
information, or financing, and/or dampening demand by lowering expected profits. Lessons from psychology 
and behavioral economics are considered where they are particularly relevant. Jack (2013) motivates the focus on 
constraints to adoption, rather than specific technologies, as a framework that helps identify effective strategies to 
address common inefficiencies and constraints in order to encourage the adoption and use of more than one 
technology.  
 
ATAI uses this conceptual framework of seven constraints to drive its research competitions. Randomized 
evaluations are selected for ATAI funding based not only on methodological rigor, logistical viability, and 
innovation, but also on their potential for both a significant contribution to public knowledge, and practical 
influence and scalability in related contexts. Field experiments require, by their very nature, durable partnerships 
with real-world implementation groups that are working directly with smallholder farmers in order to randomize 
interventions and deliver credible results. Partner organizations may work as agro-dealers, contract farming 
groups, extension agents, financial service providers, technology developers, or otherwise. ATAI views more 
favorably studies that evaluate questions of key importance to large-scale program and policy partners, 
particularly those that are difficult to address without causal evidence, and those that have received less research 
attention to date. 
 
To meet these criteria, technologies under investigation are those where there is credible field data signaling that 
adoption would prove neither distasteful nor ineffective in target farmers’ contexts, and that the take-up and use 
of a technology is likely to prove utility-enhancing, profitable, and welfare-increasing for smallholder farmers and 
others along agricultural value chains. For such promising under-adopted technologies, ATAI funds social science 
field experiments to provide evidence on the strategies that work in helping farmers adopt, and ultimately benefit 
from, these technologies. 
 
In the sections that follow, we summarize particular components of the evidence base given the accumulation of 
ATAI-generated experimental evidence in four areas: (1) credit and savings, (2) risk, (3) information, and (4) 
input and output market inefficiencies. This does not imply that the latter three (of the seven total) constraints to 
adoption, i.e. externalities and land and labor markets, are excluded from this chapter because they do not bind 
or do not deserve further investigation. These topics are not covered here simply because there is less rigorous 
micro-evidence given the difficulty of examining them through the lens of RCTs6. This is not intended to be an 
exhaustive review. ATAI-funded studies are often presented in greater detail given our familiarity with their 
contributions. Each section begins by motivating the specific constraint to technology adoption, pulling from a 
range of rigorous non-experimental work and some theoretical work to characterize the constraint facing 
farmers. We then summarize findings from recent randomized evaluations in an effort to distill policy-relevant 
insights. 
 
                                                             
5 When presenting the constraints to agricultural technology adoption framework, “credit” is sometimes used as shorthand for “credit 
market inefficiencies.” Interventions targeting this constraint can be credit, savings, or other services that help provide access to liquidity. 
6 Fortunately, these topics are taken up in Jack 2013, using other methodologies to discuss the role of factor markets for productivity 
growth in agriculture. There are limited examples of randomized evaluations of securing land tenure, although preliminary results are 
available in Uganda, Benin, and Rwanda from Goldstein et al. at the World Bank Gender Innovation Lab. 
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CREDIT AND SAVINGS 
MOTIVATION 
Agricultural income streams are characterized by large cash inflows once or twice a year that do not align well 
with specific times when farmers need access to capital to either make agricultural investments or, for example, 
pay school fees. If there is limited access to credit in an area, farmers may not have cash on hand to make 
agricultural productivity investments unless they are able to save, or can afford the potentially high interest rates 
of informal lending. However, saving can be difficult for farmers given their limited resources, a variety of 
demands on their money, and the seasonal cycle of production and prices of their agricultural production. Credit 
and saving products could help farmers make investments in inputs and other technologies by making cash 
available when needed. Yet many developing countries, and particularly rural areas, have limited access to formal 
financial services that could provide this liquidity. Credit constraints have been reflected in farmers self-reports 
(Croppenstedt et al. 2003; Burke, Falcao Berquist, and Miguel 2017), and are associated with less use of 
productive inputs like high-yielding varieties (Njagi et al. 2017).  
 
On the supply side, formal financial service providers are often unwilling or unable to serve smallholders. Few 
products suitable to agricultural livelihoods are available, and despite the wide proliferation of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), most are limited to nonagricultural activities given there are substantial challenges inherent in 
long-cycle agricultural lending (Morduch 1999; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005). Lenders in these 
contexts charge high interest rates to help offset their assessment of the risk that loans will not be repaid. These 
higher interest rates can, perversely, have the effect of attracting only borrowers with no intention of repaying 
(adverse selection), thus driving interest rates even higher, as lenders seek to offset increased risk (Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1981), further reducing access to credit for the small-scale farmer (Banerjee and Newman 1994; Bardhan 
and Udry 1999; Conning and Udry 2007). Group-liability microfinance models, though popular in urban 
markets to reach low-income borrowers through social guarantees, may be ill-suited to serve smallholders in 
contexts where dominant risks driving default like weather and price shocks are common among members in the 
localized group. Group members will be unable to insure other members who cannot pay off a loan if, for 
example, everyone’s harvest is devastated by the same local flood or pest. 
 
On the demand side, demand from farmers for formal credit products is low. Even where formal financial 
products are available, farmers may opt to borrow money from within their social networks, or informal lenders. 
Preliminary findings from the rollout of Kshetriya Grameen Financial Services (KGFS), a microfinance portfolio 
in rural Tamil Nadu, show that 72% of farmers’ loans at the beginning of the season are from formal sources, but 
only 35% are from formal sources by the end of the season. Farmers seem to shift to informal borrowing given 
quick loan approvals and more flexible (though more costly) loan terms are available. This use of informal 
borrowing is particularly prevalent among marginalized farmers: 82% of the agricultural loans taken out by 
marginal farmers were from informal sources compared to 46% among medium-landholding farmers (EPoD 
IFMR LEAD Policy Brief 2016). Even where formal financial services are available, they are often highly 
disadvantageous to smallholder farmers. Farmers’ credit needs are different from urban microcredit customers 
for which the common microcredit products are designed, with weekly repayments and group liability. Most 
loan offers and repayment schedules are poorly timed to fit seasonal production cycles and price fluctuations. 
Uncertainty or risk aversion can also make farmers hesitant to take on debt. Profits in farming are uncertain, and 
are often low without complementary investments. Options for collateral to back a loan are limited in these 
environments, and assets like land may be too fundamental to basic livelihood to risk in order to access a line of 
credit (Boucher 2008), or unacceptable to back a loan in insecure contracting environments. Accessing and using 
financial products can also be even more difficult for farmers without high levels of financial literacy. 
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These credit market inefficiencies result in limited access to liquid capital from formal financial services. There is 
policy appetite to leverage new technologies and approaches to expand formal credit and savings mechanisms to 
rural households, particularly given the proliferation of microcredit in urban markets. But even where 
microcredit has expanded widely among low-income urban clientele, evidence from randomized impact 
evaluations show limited ability for microcredit to transform the average entrepreneur’s business productivity 
and revenues, instead providing value through increased flexibility in how households “make money, consume, 
and invest” (J-PAL and IPA Policy Bulletin 2015). In the smallholder context, we focus specifically on whether 
expanding access to formal credit on the margin of what is already available shows potential to unlock productive, 
profitable investments that improve rural livelihoods. Where expanding access to credit shows potential, studies 
investigate product designs aiming to increase credit access and their benefits specifically for smallholder farmers. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE SUMMARY:  
IMPACTS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES AND LESSONS FOR PRODUCT DESIGN 
 
1. Increasing access to formal credit has typically had limited impacts on smallholder 
farmers’ profitability: Low take up of credit is one reason behind these limited impacts. A review of 
nine randomized evaluations that expanded access to credit on the margin of what’s available informally 
for smallholders in these contexts showed that a majority of farmers did not use credit when it was 
offered to them. In studies in Mali (Beaman et al. 2015a), Malawi (Giné and Yang 2009), Morocco 
(Crépon et al. 2015), and Sierra Leone (Casaburi et al. 2014), only between 17 and 33 percent of 
eligible farmers took up the loans that they were offered7. This is not dissimilar to the takeup rates 
observed from randomized evaluations of more traditional, typically urban, group-liability 
microfinance: “In Ethiopia, India, Mexico, and Morocco, when MFIs offered loans to eligible 
borrowers, take-up ranged from 13 to 31 percent, which was much lower than partner MFIs originally 
forecasted” (J-PAL and IPA Policy Bulletin 2015). However, we can investigate the impacts of credit on 
those smallholders who do take up the new products. The following randomized evaluations found that 
while farmers who used newly available credit products invested in more productive technologies and 
practices such as crops grown, land cultivated, and inputs8 used, in most cases this access to credit did 
not increase their profits (Beaman et al. 2015a). For example, households who took up loans in 
Morocco invested more in agriculture and animal husbandry (Crépon et al. 2015), while in Ethiopia, 
microcredit increased crop-related expenditures including seeds and fertilizer, and wages and rents for 
land and equipment (Tarozzi et al. 2013). However, neither detected any increase in profits. Key 
exceptions (Burke et al. 2017, Fink et al. 2014, and Maitra et al. 2017) will be described later in this 
section when discussing the evidence for improved credit product design. 
 
2. Targeted savings products can increase agricultural investment, but encouraging active 
use of these products can be a challenge: Takeup rates in terms of either accepting assistance to 
open a savings account or agreeing to participate in communal savings groups ranged from 54-90% in 
four randomized trials in rural areas of Kenya (Dupas, Keats, and Robinson 2015), Malawi (Brune et al. 
2016; Dupas et al. 2017), and Uganda (Dupas et al. 2017). However, if takeup only includes people 
who make at least one deposit beyond enrollment, the engagement rates are only between 18-32% in 
these studies9. Dupas et al. (2017) take stock of 16 completed randomized trials of savings products in 
                                                             
7 See further discussion of the breakdown of the products, take-up rates, and impacts for these agricultural credit experiments in 
Magruder 2018). 
8 In this case increased use of fertilizers, pesticides, and labor. 
9 Dupas et al. (2017) attribute low usage of the savings bank accounts in Malawi and Uganda to living hand to mouth based on 
consumption measures and self-reports at endline, and also document that people who live farther from the bank branches used the 
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13 countries, concluding that “few products appeal to more than a small minority (….) overall, the 
pattern that emerges, if any, is that different features matter for different segments of the population, 
with no ‘one size fits all’” (Dupas et al. 2017). 
 
Where studies specifically engaged farmers and were designed to detect the impact of savings access on 
agricultural investment, studies have shown that savings helped smallholders smooth volatility 
(Aggarwal, Francis, and Robinson 2018), build buffer stocks (Carter, Laajaj and Yang 2015), reduce 
financial pressure from family and neighbors (Batista and Vicente 2017) and increase agricultural 
productivity investments (Brune et al. 2016; Carter, Laajaj and Yang 2015; Batista and Vicente 2017). 
Given the prevalence of low take up rates, which interventions can effectively expand access to credit 
and savings products where these financial services could benefit smallholder farmers? Approaches that 
show promise tailor credit and savings products more effectively to smallholder farmers’ needs and may 
help reduce the costs and risks to reach this market segment. 
 
3. Offer flexible collateral arrangements: Collateral is one classic solution to the asymmetric 
information problems inherent in credit markets. Unfortunately, many smallholder farmers have few 
substantial capital assets that they can use as collateral, whether due directly to asset poverty, or to poor 
property rights. As a result, these farmers have limited liability—meaning that they cannot be forced to 
repay business loans in full in the case of failure. Land titles are often unclear and seizure under default 
could be costly and difficult (Jack 2013), constraining credit supply, while on the demand side ‘risk 
rationing’ may inhibit poorly insured and diversified farmers from taking the credit risks they are 
offered, even if expected profits are positive (Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger 2008). Behavioral 
economics further suggests that farmers may be loss averse, unwilling to risk their land to open a line of 
credit, given how critical land is for their livelihood and the uncertainty involved and risk of default. 
Solving credit access problems with land is therefore an uphill struggle. 
 
For technologies that require a large initial investment but retain their value well, self-collateralization 
through leasing can be an alternative approach to the problem. Under a leasing arrangement, farmers 
can make payments towards the investment and if they default, the lender can repossess the asset. In 
Kenya, a dairy cooperative extended asset-collateralized credit offers to smallholders to purchase a large 
water tank and loan payments were deducted from milk sales. If borrowers failed to repay, the 
cooperative would repossess the tank. However there were no repossessions among farmers allowed to 
collateralize 75% of their loans, and only a 0.7% repossession rate among those offered 96% asset 
collateralization (Jack, Kremer, de Laat, and Suri 2016, see table below produced by J-PAL Africa). 
Asset collateralization (rather than 
large down payments and joint liability 
requirements) increased takeup of the 
water tank from 2.4% to 41.9%. 
Smallholder households that received 
this loan offer showed reductions in 
the time children spent on agricultural 
activities: boys spent less time tending 
livestock, and girls both spent less time 
fetching water and were more likely to 
be enrolled in school as a result. 
                                                             
accounts less. Aggarwal, Francis, and Robinson (2018) is an exception to these engagement rates, but the intervention itself is distinctly 
different from savings accounts at banks, instead introducing a grain storage savings scheme built into existing ROSCA groups in Western 
Kenya. Take-up rates and impacts are summarized in the section on adjusting products to the seasonality of farmer livelihoods. 
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Another flexible collateral arrangement allows smallholders to use stored crops as collateral to secure a 
loan, using warehouse receipts to guarantee claims. These crop inventory loans can also encourage 
higher take up of credit, and have been shown to increase use of purchased agricultural inputs in Burkina 
Faso where preliminary results also show promising indications of increased household consumption as a 
result (Delavallade and Godlonton, in progress). In Kenya, harvest-time maize storage loans did not 
increase agricultural input use, but did significantly increase smallholders’ profits through temporal 
arbitrage, by allowing farmers to hold on to maize longer and sell only after prices rose (Burke et al. 
2017)10. 
 
These evaluations show proof of concept for both asset-collateralized and inventory credit schemes. 
However, new credit schemes using these in-kind collateral arrangements should not assume they will 
be immune from threats to credit demand. Limits to the demand for new credit products can stem from 
lack of financial literacy or trust, the uncertainty of future in-kind collateral value, particularly in 
volatile markets (Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger 2008), or prohibitively high “switching” costs to 
engage in new lending or related trading relationships (Casaburi et al. 2014)11. 
 
4. Improve credit market information: Where physical collateral is lacking, helping borrowers build 
reputational collateral can unlock access to credit. Without credit histories, banks cannot identify risky 
borrowers, and often lack viable recourse to recover their losses. Deserving and profitable borrowers 
could be screened out of the credit pool, suggesting that expansion of credit rating services may improve 
access to credit. Evaluations of related informational innovations on borrowers include biometric 
identification (Giné et al. 2010), credit bureaus (de Janvry et al. 2010), and “agent-intermediated 
lending” which incentivizes agents to identify productive, low-risk individual borrowers (Maitra et al. 
2017). These studies show proof of concept for these informational innovations to improve credit 
market performance, including repayment rates, especially where national ID systems were lacking. 
Additional research is needed to understand the viability of this approach in different credit markets, and 
how these interventions could impact farmers’ overall credit portfolios and agricultural investment 
decisions. 
 
5. Adjust financial service schedules to accommodate the seasonality of smallholders’ 
livelihoods: Farmers’ income tends to be very lumpy and uncertain; many smallholders produce only 
a few crops for sale and will not see agricultural income materialize until harvest times when harvested 
crops can be sold. When harvest eventually arrives, all smallholder producers sell in the same time 
interval. This floods local markets with supply, lowering the prices for these staple grains in typically 
poorly integrated rural markets where geographic re-distribution to meet urban consumer demand is 
costly.12 As a result, prices are lowest immediately after the harvest and peak before the next harvest 
(Burke et al. 2017). Without access to liquid capital from savings or credit products, farmers face pre-
harvest hungry seasons where they are primarily consumers, precisely when prices have risen often to 
their (annual) peak due to limited supply. This “selling low and buying high” can drain limited resources, 
perpetuating a cycle of poverty including hungry seasons where there are limited buffers or 
opportunities to smooth this seasonal volatility. This volatility similarly makes saving challenging, 
particularly for agricultural purchase investments that would typically be made some time after the 
                                                             
10 (Burke et al. 2017) is discussed in greater detail in the upcoming section as a clear example of how the careful timing of product offers 
and loan repayment schedules is key to support smallholder farmers. 
11 The section on Input & Output Markets will describe in greater detail how producers’ relationships with traders can be important 
mediating factors to access financial services. 
12 See discussion and related literature on poorly integrated markets in the section on Input and Output Markets. 
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harvest in preparation for planting and growing season activities. For this reason, implementers that do 
offer credit to smallholder farmers may offer planting and growing season loans that provide access to 
capital at periods of key agricultural investments while allowing farmers to delay repayment of a loan 
until after the harvest. 
 
Seasonal price fluctuations can create an opportunity for harvest-time storage loans to help farmers 
smooth consumption and even generate profit from intertemporal arbitrage. Burke et al. (2017) 
estimate that the median household in their sample in Western Kenya appears to be giving up equivalent 
of 1-2 months of agricultural wages by selling maize when prices are low and buying when they are high, 
instead of the reverse. These researchers partnered with One Acre Fund to offer harvest-time loans 
collateralized by stored maize, allowing farmers to borrow as a function of the number of bags they put 
in storage. 63 percent of farmers took out a harvest-time maize storage loan, which were on average 
about $100 with a 10% flat interest rate and repayment expected in 9 months. Access to this harvest-
time storage loan allowed farmers to store maize when prices were low, use the loan to meet their 
present consumption needs, and postpone maize sales until prices rose to generate higher returns (Burke 
et al. 2017). Their figure below shows one facet of their preliminary results: that October loan offers, 
when prices were lowest, were more effective at increasing maize inventories, net revenues, and total 
household consumption than January loan offers (i.e. when prices were already rising, about midway 
toward their peak)13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By randomizing the density of treatment across locations, researchers find that profits are concentrated 
in areas where fewer farmers were offered loans. Though borrowers in less-saturated areas captured 
larger returns, the presence of the credit intervention smoothed seasonal price fluctuations enough to 
reduce volatility for everyone buying and selling maize in these poorly integrated markets, effectively 
spreading benefits even to households in these communities that did not themselves access the storage 
loans. The estimated 28% return on investment encouraged One Acre Fund to consider scaling this 
maize storage loan in East Africa. 
 
A savings scheme that similarly targeted volatile maize prices in Kenya used existing ROSCAs to 
introduce a group-based grain storage scheme (“GSRA”), allowing participating members to deposit a 
fraction of their maize harvest to be sold later in the season after prices rose (Aggarwal, Francis, and 
Robinson 2018). Each GSRA identified a member to store group maize bags on a wooden stand in their 
home (typically the treasurer or other leader of the group) and received a ledger book to record deposits 
and withdrawals. “About 56% of respondents took up the products. Respondents in the maize storage 
                                                             
13 The full presentation of preliminary results provided by author Lauren Falcao Bergquist is titled “Arbitrage and Integration in African 
Agricultural Markets” and is available at: https://www.atai-research.org/atai-hosts-roundtable-on-learning-agenda-for-agricultural-
development-and-transformatio/ 
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intervention were 23 percentage points more likely to store maize (on a base of 69%),” selling later and 
at higher prices than those that were not using the GSRA (Aggarwal, Francis, and Robinson 2018). 
 
Loans for consumption during the lean season can help bridge the time when food prices are high and 
home grain stores are depleted because the harvest has not yet arrived (Basu and Wong 2015). In 
Zambia, smallholder farmers facing the annual peak hungry season engage in wage labor contracts on 
local farms, i.e. “ganyu,” to make ends meet. When offered a subsidized loan during the hungry season, 
whether as cash or maize with repayment due after harvest, over 98% of eligible households opted to 
borrow with 80-94% repayment rates, which improved their hungry season consumption and reduced 
both their use of higher interest informal loans and their selling of household labor to others’ fields. 
Those receiving the loans were more likely to invest labor in their own fields, which increased their 
agricultural output by 8 percent in response to treatment, even without inducing additional agricultural 
input usage like fertilizers, while also raising the average village-level wage labor daily earnings by 15 
percent (Fink, Jack, and Masiye 2018). This pilot intervention was expensive, particularly the in-kind 
maize loan, so researchers are currently exploring opportunities to test a more cost-effective design of 
the program at scale embedded within a contract farming outfit in Zambia. 
 
6. Design financial products to overcome behavioral biases and help protect savings from 
spending pressures: Financial product design adaptations that target behavioral biases have also 
shown promise. Helping farmers save for inputs from harvest until planting time, including nudges to 
behavior to overcome time inconsistency (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2011) can increase purchase of 
agricultural inputs. Allocating resources for particular purchases at particular times using labels or 
commitment devices can direct investment toward these purchases. In Malawi, Brune et al. (2016) 
found that farmers given the option of a commitment savings account, designed to help delay 
withdrawals from the account until input-purchasing season, preserved greater amounts of savings 
throughout both the harvest and planting seasons, cultivated significantly more land, invested more in 
agricultural inputs, and increased their consumption. An experiment currently in the field in Rwanda is 
exploring ways to increase demand for commitment savings accounts while also providing farmers 
recourse when facing emergencies (Jones, Kondylis and Mobarak, in progress). 
 
Issuing loan capital or input subsidies to farmers as vouchers for agricultural inputs has been a common 
technique to direct capital toward agricultural investment (Carter, Laajaj and Yang 2016; Duflo, 
Kremer and Robinson 2010; Giné et al. 2010; among others), although takeup of input subsidy 
vouchers can be low, possibly signaling that other constraints are binding technology adoption in such 
contexts (Carter et al. 2013). In Mozambique, Batista & Vicente (2017) tested whether providing input 
vouchers as a bonus rewarding the use of mobile savings accounts increased savings and fertilizer use14. 
Farmers that received the commitment savings bonus were 31-36 percentage points more likely to use 
fertilizer if they only received a bonus, compared to 40-41 percentage points more when their social 
network also had access to the savings bonus. The authors interpret these findings as evidence that these 
savings accounts decreased social pressure to share resources, given farmers were less likely to lend 
money to their closest farming friends. This is consistent with social pressures to spend observed by 
Goldberg (2011) in Malawi.15 
 
                                                             
14 Randomly assigned farmers received a 20% savings bonus on their average savings balance, paid out as a voucher for urea fertilizer. 
Another group of farmers had two of their closest friends also receive information about mobile money and fertilizer, and a final group had 
both the savings bonus and information given to friends. 
15 The study measures differences in spending windfall income between farmers who win a public lottery, compared to farmers who win a 
private lottery. She finds that “public winners spend 35 percent more than private winners in the period immediately following the 
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7. Financial service provision should be carefully considered alongside risk mitigation: 
While tailored financial product designs can better serve smallholders, increasing access to credit in 
isolation from addressing the risk that farmers face is unlikely to be effective in encouraging agricultural 
technology adoption. Some initial evidence suggests that for smallholders, a lack of traditional credit is 
not the primary constraint to becoming more profitable. In northern Ghana, results from a randomized 
evaluation suggest that the risk of crop failure deters smallholders from making investments in their 
farms, which contributes to low yields and profits (Karlan et al. 2014). When offered rainfall indexed 
insurance, more than two-thirds of farmers purchased it and farmers cultivated more acres, used more 
inputs that boosted yields, and spent more time working on their farms. In Odisha, Emerick et al. 
(2015) find that smallholder farmers that received the flood-tolerant rice variety Swarna-Sub1 invested 
in a more labor-intensive improved planting practice, more agricultural inputs (fertilizer), and were 
36% more likely to use credit the second year, typically offered from local cooperatives early in the 
growing season. This effect can plausibly be explained either as a result of increased demand or supply 
side responses in the credit market (Emerick et al. 2015). These evaluations show that when households 
are released from risk constraints they can find the capital from sources available to them to substantially 
increase investment. 
 
LOOKING FORWARD 
Although the experimental evidence suggests that an injection of credit alone is unlikely sufficient to transform 
smallholders’ livelihoods, there is some encouraging evidence from approaches with careful product design. 
Financial service design innovation, particularly to encourage storage or savings, can generate more supportive 
services for farmers that can help them make investments or manage their volatile livelihoods. There is policy 
appetite to identify whether digital financial services will be able to connect rural borrowers to lending 
institutions (Francis, Blumenstock, & Robinson 2017) and encourage financial behavior conducive to agricultural 
investment. More research is needed on these digital financial service channels and product designs, to 
understand their potential to support farmers’ financial portfolios in a manner that protects farmers while 
encouraging profitable investments. More research is needed to develop and test credit product designs and 
delivery channels that fit smallholders’ needs with respect to the timing of offers, repayment structures, and 
collateral agreements. 
 
 
RISK 
MOTIVATION 
Smallholder farmers have limited buffer stocks to cope with volatile food prices and climate uncertainty, and 
typically have few formal financial services to protect them from risk. The systemic risks of agricultural 
production jeopardize smallholder farmers’ ability to recoup their investments at harvest. Risk exposure 
therefore plays an important role in farmers’ agricultural investment decisions, including the use of productive 
inputs like fertilizer (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011). 
 
Rural communities have developed many informal mechanisms to cope with risk. For example, households may 
buy or sell assets in response to fluctuations in income (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993), and communities may 
temporarily assist households experiencing a negative shock like an unexpected medical expense with the 
expectation that the household will do the same for others in the future (Conning and Udry 2007). While these 
                                                             
lotteries (…) consistent with a seven percent tax on surplus income in a simple model where a fraction of money that is not spent 
immediately must be shared with others in the social network” (Goldberg 2011). 
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strategies are useful, in many cases they are insufficient. Farmers face many sources of uncertainty beyond 
weather and environmental factors including natural disasters, pests, and disease. Price risk and relationships with 
output markets can jeopardize farmers’ ability to recoup their investments at harvest, and such risks can depress 
productive input use. In addition to the risks inherent in the agricultural production status quo, new technologies 
often bear specific risks, such as uncertainty about how to use the technology correctly and how to market the 
output16. 
 
The classic economic view of poor farmers is that their lack of savings and other resources to fall back on causes 
them to prefer agricultural approaches with more reliable, but lower, average returns. Households often 
diversify their sources of income to spread around risk (Banerjee and Duflo 2007). Farmers may see the adoption 
of new technologies as risky, especially early in the adoption process when proper use and average yields are not 
well understood. Technologies that carry even a small risk of a loss may not be worth large expected gains if risks 
cannot be offset (Boucher et al. 2008). Higher-value crops including produce and cash crops may also be more 
sensitive to weather. So, while investments exist that could increase profitability, these may also increase the 
risks of farming. 
 
Behavioral biases also come into play around risky decisions (Kahneman 2003). Risk averse farmers may prefer a 
more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff over an uncertain payoff from unfamiliar technologies. 
Ambiguity aversion can lead farmers to stick to their status quo, preferring known risks with a more familiar 
probability of gains and losses, rather than unknown risks, even in cases where these choices may actually be less 
risky. Both risk and ambiguity aversion are important considerations when looking to encourage take-up of novel 
risk mitigating financial products or technologies (Bryan 2010, Hill et al. 2011 and Ross et al. 2012). 
 
Evidence exists that rural households are able to mitigate idiosyncratic risk (Bardhan and Udry 1999), but that 
rural residents are relatively unprotected against aggregate risks – weather and crop price shocks – common to 
smallholder rain-fed agriculture in poorly integrated markets (Conning and Udry 2007, Fafchamps and Hill 2008, 
McIntosh et al 2017, Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2014 and Emerick et al 2016). Given extreme weather events can 
destroy a large portion of harvest across a region, and that such weather events are only increasingly likely given 
global trends including climate change, there is a need for effective risk-mitigation strategies to protect farmers 
from these aggregate risks. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE SUMMARY:  
INSURANCE PRODUCT DESIGN AND RISK-MITIGATING TECHNOLOGIES 
 
1. Individually marketed rain-index insurance products suffer from very low demand from 
smallholders; substantial subsidies are required to generate strong insurance demand: 
One common risk mitigation strategy is insurance. Developed countries have widespread agricultural 
insurance coverage that is in many cases compulsory and highly subsidized, and often indemnity based, 
requiring insurers to visit farms to verify loss claims (IBRD 2010). In developing countries there are far 
more smallholder farmers dispersed in rural areas with small landholdings operating in poor regulatory 
environments. Weather index insurance, making payments to farmers in a specified area based on levels 
of an observable variable like rainfall, decreases administrative costs to insure smallholders. 
 
However, field experimentation shows that few farmers purchase individually marketed rain-index 
insurance policies at market prices.  
                                                             
16 These types of risk are discussed further in the sections on Information and Input & Output Markets, respectively. 
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“Index insurance products struggle to launch without heavy initial subsidies, and results are consistent 
with substantial lack of trust in index insurance” (J-PAL, CEGA, and ATAI 2016, includes figure 
below). 
Few products have succeeded in sustaining demand in the developing world with prices set at market 
rates, above actuarially fair prices -- full market price typically yields an uptake of around 16%, and even 
a 50% subsidy only increases demand to 38% (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012, Karlan et al. 2014 and 
Cole et al 2013; 2014). As a result, these products do not appear to be commercially viable as 
standalone products. 
 
2. Financial education, group protection, and links to credit have not proven viable 
options to improve insurance demand: “Linking credit with insurance has mixed results, suffering 
from the same demand problems that have beset standalone index insurance. The offering of 
indemnified loans that interlink an insurance product with credit appears promising, but demand for 
such loans has been shown to be surprisingly low in the few trials that have tested this mechanism 
(McIntosh et al. 2017, Giné and Yang 2009, Karlan et al. 2014 and Karlan et al. 2011)” (J-PAL, CEGA, 
and ATAI 2016). Linking credit with insurance has even been shown to drive down credit demand 
(Banerjee et al. 201417 and Giné and Yang 2009). 
 
Recent research has found that companies that engage in contract farming can be well-positioned to 
adjust the timing of insurance and payment arrangements to increase take-up. Casaburi and Willis 
(2017) find that when a large private company engaged in contract farming in Kenya offered to provide 
insurance to sugar cane producers by deducting premiums from farmer revenues at harvest time, take-
up rates at actuarially fair prices were 71.6%, 67 percentage points higher than the equivalent standardly 
timed contract. 
 
Although farmers’ trust and understanding surely influences demand for weather index insurance, 
resolving these concerns has not proven sufficient to solve the demand issues that beset this financial 
product. Demand for insurance does increase when farmers observe payouts over time (Cai et al. 2016 
and Karlan et al. 2014); receiving payouts in the previous year has a strong effect on increasing 
                                                             
17 Banerjee et al. (2014) investigates demand for health insurance, rather than agricultural weather-index insurance. 
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subsequent demand, increasing demand by almost 30% (Cole et al. 2014). However, not receiving 
payouts when a fair price has been paid has a strong negative effect on subsequent demand. Since the 
latter state is the ‘normal’ year for insurance consumers, this does not bode well for the adoption of 
insurance and its commercial viability. Cole et al. (2013) explicitly tests whether efforts to improve 
trust can improve take-up of insurance, finding that “in Andhra Pradesh, households were more likely to 
purchase insurance if an agent from a well-known microfinance institution endorsed the product, but in 
Gujarat, a similar endorsement in a marketing video had no effect” (J-PAL, CEGA, and ATAI 2016). In 
another study from Gujarat, Gaurav et al. (2011) found that receiving an invitation to a financial literacy 
training increased take-up by 5.3 percentage points, but the cost of the training was more than three 
times the full cost of premiums. 
 
Basis risk, the risk that the official weather observation will not accurately reflect a farmer’s loss, can 
also dampen take-up. For example, a farmer may experience poor weather conditions that damage their 
harvest, but if rainfall at the weather station is adequate, there would be no pay out. Mobarak and 
Rosenzweig (2012) find in Uttar Pradesh that for every kilometer increase in perceived distance from 
the weather station, demand for weather index insurance decreases by 6.4% (approximately equivalent 
to 10% less of a discount from the market price). This suggests that improvements in index design could 
help resolve basis risk, using improved data to more closely align the experienced conditions of 
smallholders’ plots with the measured conditions at data collection facilities (like rainfall at weather 
station locations) used to set the index. Since basis risk is largely covariate for a geographic area, another 
promising approach appears to be the provision of insurance to groups that are already providing 
informal risk pooling of idiosyncratic risks among their membership (Dercon et al. 2014; Mobarak and 
Rosenzweig 2012). Index insurance can be a complement to informal risk mitigation where these 
informal risk pooling arrangements are smoothing idiosyncratic risks. 
 
3. Adopting insurance can increase risk-taking in production decisions: Where insurance 
projects have been successful in achieving widespread uptake (largely via free distribution) they tend to 
increase the appetite for activities vulnerable to risk (Cole et al. 2013, Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012, 
Gunnsteinson 2014, Cai et al. 2009 and Cai 2016). Magruder (2018) emphasizes, however, that these 
studies are “a handful of promising results that suggest the potential for risk reduction to spur 
technology adoption,” necessarily drawn from exceptional contexts where insurance take-up rates were 
sufficient to detect the impacts of insurance on productive technology adoption. This shift to higher risk 
and potentially more profitable production can have the somewhat counterintuitive effect of increasing 
the overall exposure of agricultural activity to rainfall volatility. Insured households are better financially 
insulated (Janzen and Carter 2018), but landless laborers, whose income relies on harvesting crops, may 
become more exposed to risk as a result (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2014). This is concerning if the 
poorest rural households have limited alternatives should agricultural wage labor opportunities 
disappear. 
  
4. New risk-mitigating crop varieties provide a promising alternative or complement to 
insurance that can reduce farmers’ risk and produce higher yields: Scientists have developed 
stress-tolerant crops to protect farmers and help the broader agricultural system cope with extreme 
weather. These breeder-selected varieties of common seeds are agronomically designed to maintain high 
yields if a drought or flood occurs. Dar et al. (2013) conducted a two-year randomized evaluation with 
the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) to study the effects of a flood-tolerant rice variety, 
Swarna-Sub1, on rice yields and farmer behavior in Odisha, India. Switching from Swarna to Swarna-
Sub1 cultivation does not require significant changes in farmer behavior. Flood-tolerant Swarna-Sub1 
rice reduced risk for smallholder farmers and encouraged additional investment in their farms, resulting 
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in substantially increased yields in 
both flood and non-flood years (Dar 
et al. 2013). Yields of this flood-
resistant rice variety were as good 
as regular varieties in normal 
conditions and superior during 
floods, and the yield gain went 
disproportionately to low-caste 
farmers because of the less-desirable 
risk-prone location of their lands 
due to generations of social 
marginalization (see Figures 1 and 
2, at right, from J-PAL, CEGA, 
ATAI 2015). Higher yields 
increased farmers’ revenue by 
approximately US$47 per hectare 
relative to farmers in comparison 
villages, and 36% of this 
additional revenue was reinvested 
in their land. The results show 
how farmers respond to risk 
reduction by crowding in other 
investments and technological 
changes, which effectively double 
farmers’ expected gains: first from 
the agronomic benefits of the 
improved seed itself, and an equal 
benefit reaped from unlocking more productive practices when protected from risk. These researchers 
are now evaluating the long-term effects of Swarna Sub-1, as well as the yield, welfare, and labor 
market impacts of other drought- and saline-tolerant crop varieties. 
 
Yet longer-term analysis shows that even improved varieties like SwarnaSub1, with demonstrated 
impacts and effective demand, have not been widely adopted. This shifts attention to other constraints, 
particularly the importance of seed supply and extension systems for technology diffusion, which will be 
discussed in the remaining sections in this chapter. 
 
LOOKING FORWARD 
Given insufficient demand for individual-level insurance, and the limited availability of agronomic technologies 
that could singlehandedly protect farmers across a wide range of agro-climatic conditions, ongoing research is 
focused on adjustments to, and combinations of, these risk mitigation approaches (Carter et al. 2017a). Could 
institutions engage in risk-sharing to move risk away from particularly vulnerable smallholder farmers? For 
example, perhaps financial institutions or governments could serve as clients for meso-level insurance to see if 
that benefits smallholder farmers. “Under this arrangement, [e.g. the World Bank Group’s Global Index 
Insurance Facility (GIIF) and African Reinsurance Corporation (Africa Re) plan], a government or institution 
would reimburse insurers above a set loss ratio. This decreases risk and costs for insurers and could lead to lower 
premiums for farmers” (Carter et al. 2017b). 
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Or, given willingness to pay for individual insurance has been a challenge, perhaps free or subsidized insurance 
could be offered as a form of social protection, achieving a multiplier effect by releasing farmers’ production 
decisions from risk constraints. Ongoing research is testing strategic combinations of financial products including 
index insurance, precautionary savings, and emergency credit (i.e. products with explicit or implicit limited 
liability in case of weather shocks), to understand if these bundled products can protect smallholders across a 
spectrum of risks of varying severity (Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Lane in progress). Or perhaps financial products 
could be combined with risk-protective seeds in an attempt to better mitigate risk under a wide range of 
conditions. An evaluation is underway by Carter et al. (in progress) that offers a combination of drought tolerant 
maize and index insurance in Tanzania and Mozambique, given index insurance could protect against the 
extremely adverse events that prove so taxing that even stress-resistant seeds fail (Carter et al. 2017a). 
 
 
INFORMATION 
MOTIVATION 
Farmers face a range of potential production technologies and practices to choose from, each of which may have 
different risk profiles and different suitability for a farmer’s own plots. Many technologies have heterogeneous 
returns that vary based on local plot characteristics and complementary input choices or agronomic practices 
(Glennerster and Suri 2017; Tjernström 2017). In addition, any single year farmers can only observe the 
performance of the technology under one weather realization, and understandably have trouble predicting 
outcomes under a range of different conditions they could experience in the future. A variety of specific 
information is therefore necessary for farmers to make good decisions as to which technologies to use at which 
specific points in time. 
 
Extension services have been a common approach used to inform farmers and encourage technology adoption, 
and have traditionally been one of national agriculture ministries’ main types of expenditure (Goyal and Nash 
2017; Davis 2008). The available literature has compiled summary statistics on the type of learning outcomes that 
we should hope to see as a result of large investments in extension systems. These statistics match anecdotal 
understanding that often status quo extension systems are characterized by limited supply of extension agents in 
communities, and even where available, low engagement with services, low adoption of recommendations, as 
well as low information diffusion beyond a select few contact farmers (Blair et al. 2013; Cunguara and Moder, 
2011; Kondylis et al. 2017; Waddington et al. 2014; Beaman et al. 2015b). 
 
Extension workers are often expected to cover large areas with limited staff. For example, in Mozambique, 
countrywide extension coverage is as low as 1.3 agents per 10,000 rural people (Coughlin 2006), while in 
Malawi approximately 50% of government extension positions remain unfilled (BenYishay and Mobarak 2014). 
Glendenning et al. (2010) estimated that fewer than 6% of the agricultural population in India reported having 
received information from the Government of India’s decades-long extension program. Extension workers may 
simply shirk responsibilities, or choose to focus their attention on villages or individuals based on their 
convenience to reach or perceived potential (Coughlin 2006), and may neglect more marginalized farmers from 
poorer (Alwang and Siegel 1994) or female-headed households (Saito 1994). Rural extension services are difficult 
and costly to monitor, limiting the potential to hold extension workers accountable and providing little direct 
incentive to show up for work or complete their duties (Anderson and Feder 2007). 
 
Duflo et al. (2008) shows another, perhaps intuitive, reason that extension can be ineffective – if it is promoting 
the use of a technology that is not profitable. They found that test plots using fertilizer recommendations from 
the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture did not encourage fertilizer adoption by farmers. In this case, Duflo et al. 
calculate that these fertilizer recommendations would have increased farmers' yields if applied, but would have 
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actually reduced farmer profits. For food security and broader economic reasons, governments are often 
interested in maximizing yields, and thus extension programs may make regional-level fertilizer and other input 
use recommendations that target yield outcomes that farmers disregard as unlikely to be profitable. Gearing 
extension service recommendations based on what is profitable is important to drive adoption. 
 
Traditional extension models that directly train “contact” farmers typically do so given budget limitations, in the 
hopes that these contact farmers will share information and encourage new practices among other farmers. 
Analyses of panel data suggest that farmers learn from observing the decisions and experiences of people in their 
social networks (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Bandiera and Rasul 2006; Munshi 2004; and Krishnan and Patnam 
2013). Conly and Udry (2010) in particular examine the importance of heterogeneity in observable 
characteristics of demonstrators for the transferability and diffusion rate of a particular technology, and Rogers 
(2003) discusses how “trialability,” the degree to which a potential adopter can try something out on a small scale 
first before adopting it completely, can also be an important factor for adoption. 
 
We present findings from randomized evaluations that show how agricultural extension can be more effective in 
both the initial design of channels and pedagogy, and the use of social networks to encourage the spread of 
technology adoption. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE SUMMARY:  
IMPROVING LEARNING AND TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION 
 
1. Information services are important when introducing truly novel and unfamiliar 
technologies that can improve farmer welfare: Getting extension right is particularly important 
in contexts where farmers are not familiar with the improved technology and may have limited access. 
Extension systems were shown to be important when providing access to and promoting a new crop 
variety (Emerick and Dar 2017), particularly when farmers will need to shift complementary agronomic 
practices to reap the benefits. Glennerster and Suri (2017) conducted a randomized evaluation in Sierra 
Leone of the roll out of NERICA-3, a faster-maturing rice variety that can quicken harvest times for 
food insecure households but requires shifts in production behavior, in this case unfamiliar labor 
schedules and practices. Results suggest that training helped in this context: yields only increased for 
farmers who received extension services alongside free seed kits, while those who received the new seed 
without training saw a decline in yields (though small and statistically insignificant) (Glennerster and 
Suri 2017). 
 
Research is still needed on how to effectively provide farmers with information in the context of truly 
new technologies. Open questions include how to encourage adoption of new varieties that require new 
complementary behaviors in order to reap the benefits. 
 
2. Use simple and accessible channels, provide timely guidance, and focus on important 
aspects that are difficult to observe: To help farmers better use available, even familiar, 
technologies, information services should identify margins where behavior change may be difficult to 
modulate or even seem counterintuitive, but optimization could generate welfare benefits. Farmers may 
make sub-optimal decisions over long timeframes as a result of common behavioral biases, such as 
procrastination (Duflo et al. 2008), that hinder optimal decision-making. Certain aspects of production 
that are difficult to observe and learn from can be important inputs to farmers’ decision-making. For 
example in Bali, Hanna et al. (2014) engaged seaweed farmers in experimentation to “learn by noticing” 
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the outcomes from planting different seed pod sizes, a specific dimension for which they were not 
previously attentive. Participating in the trial by itself had little effect on adoption of improved 
practices, but when farmers also received a summary of the trial results on their plot, their adoption of 
these improved practices increased. 
 
Fertilizer application is an example of a particularly complex decision that can benefit from specific and 
timely recommendations given there are a variety of types, quantities, and timing to consider for 
application. A range of simple and direct tools have been found effective by helping farmers identify the 
most important dimensions of fertilizer application in their context. Duflo et al. (in progress) find that 
in Kenya, giving farmers measuring spoons led to higher fertilizer adoption. Islam (2014) finds that 
providing farmers with leaf color charts in Bangladesh significantly decreased the amount of excess urea 
fertilizer used (by 8%) and improved timing in application, increasing yields by 6.8%. 
 
ICT-enabled mobile extension can be designed to effectively improve contact with farmers with reduced 
costs to tailored, frequent, and timely information sharing. An interactive voice response system, at the 
time called Avaaj Otalo, provided timely information on weather and inputs as well as specifically 
answering farmers’ questions about agronomic practices. A randomized evaluation found that farmers 
switched to more effective inputs, dedicated more land to cash crops, and saw increased yields (Cole 
and Fernando 2018). The Avaaj Otalo hotline particularly helped farmers switch to less visually 
appealing, but more effective pest management, and impacts were greater for the group that received 
reminders at specific times aligned with growing season activities (Cole and Fernando 2018). Among 
contracted sugarcane farmers in Kenya, one-way SMS agricultural advice and reminders throughout the 
planting, growing and harvesting cycles combined with a complaint hotline led to increased fertilizer 
usage and reduced non-delivery of inputs (Casaburi et al. 2014, preliminary). 
 
3. Social networks play an important role in driving adoption: Farmers learn from observing the 
decisions and experiences of people in their social networks. For example, the previously discussed 
Avaaj Otalo experiment shows some evidence suggesting that intervention group farmers shared 
information with their peers that affected their agricultural activity. Peer farmers with more ties to 
participants in the mobile advisory service were more likely to plant the cash crop cumin and less likely 
to lose crops than less-connected households (Cole and Fernando 2018). This shows that other farmers 
can be an important source of information about new technologies.  
 
But social learning is not automatic, and the selection of extension agents and lead farmers tasked as 
communicators can result in different learning outcomes (Kondylis et al. 2017). Social learning can be 
stunted if the personal benefits are insufficient to encourage information sharing (BenYishay and 
Mobarak 2015). Learning from others can also result in a less rapid spread of technology if social 
networks are segregated or small. Beaman and Dillon (2018) find that in Mali, targeting network central 
farmers with information on composting excluded less-connected farmers, particularly women. 
Emerick (2014) demonstrates similar limitations to the inclusive diffusion of technologies – when 
targeting the adoption of an improved rice variety in Odisha that had an estimated positive return for 
84% of sampled farmers, relying on de facto social network distribution alone led to only 7% adoption, 
well below the demand elicited through door-to-door sales (40% adoption of the variety). By limiting 
seed transactions to contacts with close peers, households with smaller caste and family networks were 
less likely to adopt the technology (Emerick 2014). In this context, introducing outside buying and 
community-wide training opportunities can be critical to encourage the diffusion of new technologies. 
Indeed, Emerick and Dar (2017) found that a simple two-hour field day to observe and hear about 
experiences and outcomes with the new rice variety led to a large increase in seed adoption (from 30% 
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to 42% adoption), with the effect significantly larger for farmers below the poverty line and from lower 
caste groups. These findings “suggest that field days reduce the barriers to information transmission, 
regardless of the identities of the demonstrators” in this context (Emerick and Dar 2017). 
 
4. Advice from multiple people is important for adoption: Beaman et al (2015b) worked with the 
Malawi Department of Agriculture Extension Services (DAES) to promote pit planting, experimentally 
evaluating the selection of trained farmers using social network mapping, finding that this achieved 
much more technology diffusion compared to business-as-usual extension agent selection of trainees. 
Researchers estimate that 70% of people needed to see at least two connections to be persuaded to 
adopt the technology. Tjernström (2017) also finds evidence from Kenya that farmers are more likely to 
demand a new technology if a greater proportion of their network is observably using it. Extension 
modalities may therefore need to be adjusted to train enough contact farmers in each village, given 
multiple lead farmers may be needed to induce technology adoption. These studies suggest that a 
minimum intensity of exposure to spur adoption should not be diluted in efforts to spread limited 
resources to achieve exposure equity. 
 
5. Farmers are more likely to follow advice from demonstrations that reflect their own 
characteristics: Communicators that more closely resembled target farmers’ own demographic and 
socio-economic circumstances were more effective at promoting a new technology in Malawi 
(BenYishay and Mobarak 2014). This has important implications given discrimination against women: 
although BenYishay et al. (2016) found that female communicators in Malawi learned and retained 
information better than men, and the farmers they taught experienced higher yields, these female “lead 
farmers” were less successful at teaching or convincing others to adopt new agricultural practices. 
Micro-level data on individual interactions from 4000 farmers in these villages suggests that “other 
farmers perceive female communicators to be less able, and pay less attention to the women’s 
messages.” 
 
Greater similarity of demonstrators and learners matters not only in regards to the demographics of 
demonstrators, but also their agro-climatic conditions (Kondylis et al. 2017). Although Tjernström 
(2017) finds peer learning effects in the adoption of improved maize in mid-altitude Kenya, villages with 
more variation of (unobservable) soil nutrients were less likely to adopt an improved seed based on 
peers’ experience. So, heterogeneity seems to dampen social learning. Ongoing research conducted by 
Precision Agriculture for Development, for example, is targeting key outstanding questions about cost-
effective delivery of sufficiently tailored input recommendations that can benefit more farmers. 
 
Personal experimentation, allowing farmers to test and observe the outcomes of technology adoption 
under their own circumstances, may be particularly useful in contexts of heterogeneity. Dupas et al. (in 
progress) are rigorously testing the extent of personal experimentation and diffusion of information and 
technology use based on which farmers are selected to receive an irrigation hip pump in Western Kenya. 
Forthcoming results will allow for a comparison of technology diffusion when contact farmers are 
chosen based on willingness to pay for the technology, willingness to work (in the case of liquidity 
constraints), those voted by the community to receive the technology first, or those selected at random 
via a lottery, given the implications for targeting extension and distribution programs. 
 
6. Incentivizing extension agents can induce higher engagement with harder-to-reach 
clientele, and performance-based incentives tied to learning outcomes can increase 
technology adoption: Given the costs of serving distant rural populations and the challenges to 
deploying effective agents, we look to evidence on incentivizing financial service and extension agents to 
 22 
improve outcomes – a version of pay for performance. In the context of encouraging the adoption of 
novel financial products, Cai et al. (2009) found that incentivized extension workers were significantly 
more effective at promoting sow insurance in rural areas, while Maitra et al. (2017) used incentivized 
agents to more effectively target appropriate rural borrowers. BenYishay and Mobarak (2014) show 
proof of concept for performance-based incentives to improve the performance of agricultural extension 
agents and lead farmers. The scheme rewarded extension agents and lead farmers in Malawi for 
increased knowledge among community farmers in year one, and an increase in the adoption of 
technologies and improved practices among community members in year two. The effects were largest 
when offered to peer farmers; their effort levels effectively doubled when a bag of seeds served as a 
small performance-based incentive to improve recipient farmers’ knowledge and behavior (BenYishay 
and Mobarak 2014). 
 
LOOKING FORWARD 
Evidence presented in this section shows that well-designed information provision attuned to smallholders’ 
information needs and social networks can encourage poor farmers to invest in new technologies. There is a need 
to support farmers’ decision-making when introducing unfamiliar inputs, and early evidence demonstrates how 
to adapt information provision systems to support smallholder farmers’ in technology adoption. 
 
The inefficiencies that cripple extension systems and lead to information constraints can also impede the physical 
availability of technologies. In Uganda, Bandiera et al. (in progress) worked alongside BRAC’s roll out of their 
female extension worker model in Uganda to understand how social networks, credit constraints, and 
expectations about the returns to technology affect adoption decisions of improved seed varieties and modern 
farming practices such as zero tillage, line sowing, and disease prevention. Increases in agricultural productivity 
were achieved by effectively targeting the key “accessibility” constraint in this context -- farmers previously had 
little access to quality improved seeds. However, social connections mediated input market access: extension 
workers play an important role in selling seeds, and farmers in their networks had better access to technologies 
compared to less-connected farmers. Emerick et al. (in progress) are extending their work on improved seed and 
extension in Odisha to understand how agents in input value chains can effectively provide both information and 
technology. 
 
Given that a lack of information is unlikely the primary constraint to technology adoption where inputs are not 
locally accessible, and improved quantities, qualities, or varieties of output may not be profitable in current 
market structures, we turn our attention to supply chains and markets18. 
 
INPUT AND OUTPUT MARKETS 
MOTIVATION 
Farmers who would benefit from technology adoption may be unable to access agricultural technologies due to 
inadequate infrastructure, missing supply chains or unprofitably high prices. Where technologies simply are not 
available at the local level, clearly the presence and efficiency of input supply chains plays a critical role in 
technology adoption (Emerick et al, 2015). 
 
                                                             
18 The upcoming section often cites evaluations of information-based interventions. These are included in the section on Input and Output 
markets given their objective to drive or generate new market equilibria that benefit smallholders. 
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Output market dynamics can also affect smallholder decision-making. Information about market conditions and 
prevailing prices could influence farmers' decisions of how, when, and where to sell their harvest, while search 
and transport costs, and relationships with traders, mediate producers’ access to potential points of sale. 
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, farmers are limited in their ability to access lucrative options for sale (Barrett 
2008). The cost of doing business is likely an important factor, although the specific reasons behind high costs of 
trade for a particular context have been challenging to distinctly identify (Atkin and Donaldson 2015). 
Measurement challenges make it difficult to distinguish the degree to which long distances, poor infrastructure, 
policy-driven market distortions, intermediary market power, and relatively limited information and 
communication technology might contribute to high trade costs in a particular context (Fafchamps, Gabre-
Madhin and Minten, 2005). While estimations of transport costs in Africa are clearly high in comparison to other 
regions (MacKellar et al. 2002; Rizet and Gwet 1998; Rizet and Hine 1993), there is very little causally 
identified evidence on the competitiveness of trade in Africa (Dillon and Dambro, 2016). 
 
Where trade costs are high, there may be limited spatial arbitrage, making producers reliant on those who have 
the capacity to access these arbitrage opportunities and act as trade intermediaries (Fafchamps and Vargas-Hill 
2005). Rural markets remain poorly integrated when there are limited options for trade, and this inefficient 
movement of supply results in wide-ranging local market prices across regions and seasons (Rashid and Minot 
2010; Moser, Barret and Minten, 2009; Barrett 2008; Gilbert et al. 2017; Aker 2012; among others). This 
volatility can be a direct disincentive to widespread adoption of productive technologies (Foster and Rosenzweig 
2010) because an influx of output is met immediately by a collapse in prices (Burke et al. 2017, see their figure, 
below, showing the volatility of maize prices in East Africa). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poor infrastructure has been rigorously investigated in a few cases; road quality, for example could clearly 
increase transport costs, driving up input prices, driving down output prices, and thereby reducing the scope for 
profitable adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies. Infrastructure development to reduce transportation 
costs has been associated with increased access to output markets and smoother prices (Ali 2011). For example, 
in Sierra Leone, investments in infrastructure were correlated with lower transaction costs for both farmers and 
traders (Casaburi, Glennerster and Suri 2013). However, farmers’ ability and willingness to pay for access to 
deeper output markets should not be assumed even where road conditions are adequate (Raballand et al. 2011). 
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Contract enforcement problems in supply chains and output markets can also impede producers’ profitability. 
Buyers may trade only with trusted brokers or other traders with whom they have repeated interactions, 
resulting in a fractured chain of many short-distance, relationship-based exchanges (Fafchamps and Minten, 
1998). The surpluses offered by each small seller may be too diffuse to attract large national buyers, instead 
requiring aggregation, which often necessitates both coordination and access to capital (Sitko and Jayne, 2014). 
Unobservable dimensions of output quality can mean higher quality products go unrewarded on the market, 
resulting in the prevalence of lower quality products (Anagol forthcoming; Hoffman and Gatobu 2014; 
Fafchamps et al. 2008). 
 
Enforceable contracts could create economies of scale, and facilitate access to technologies, financial services, and 
output markets for small-scale producers (Barrett et al. 2012, World Bank Group 2016 and Casaburi et al. 2014, 
preliminary). Hansman et al. (2017) find evidence from Peru fishmeal manufacturing that vertical integration 
increases with demand for high-quality outputs; firms produce considerably higher output and are paid higher 
export prices when they own more of their suppliers. These benefits of contracting arrangements could 
presumably help smallholders access higher-value markets where economic growth in agriculture is increasingly 
concentrated (Gulati et al. 2007). But evidence is still limited, and there are risks that contract farming schemes 
can falter or collapse (Ashraf et al. 2009). 
 
In what follows, we describe the recently emerging experimental evidence based on interventions to improve the 
efficiency of input and output markets in relation to smallholder farmers. We focus on two primary domains. 
First, price discovery, given the relatively numerous studies that have tried to improve the delivery of price 
information to producers and intermediaries. We then examine a set of interventions intended to improve 
contracting in supply chains, including studies that work to improve quality recognition, to improve contracting 
performance through intermediary institutions, and to create entirely new market structures leveraging ICT 
platforms. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE SUMMARY- EARLY INSIGHTS 
 
1. Price information can lead to a reduction in price dispersion; however, farmers often 
need more than price information to access more profitable points of sale: Given that prices 
may vary substantially across relatively small distances and small intervals of time, accessing price 
information in principle could lead to larger profits for farmers, by choosing to sell at markets with 
higher prices (spatial arbitrage) or leveraging price information to bargain with traders. 
 
The following evidence underlines how price information is unlikely to affect farmer incomes or price 
levels where farmers lack bargaining power, because transport costs remain high, or there are other 
limits to output market competition. Potato farmers in West Bengal did not benefit from nearby 
wholesale and retail market price information given farmers have limited outside options for sale and 
traders appear to collude by openly discussing and coordinating price offers to farmers (Mitra et al 
2018). Fafchamps and Minten (2012) estimate the benefits that Maharashtran farmers derived from 
market and weather information delivered to their mobile phones by a commercial service called 
Reuters Market Light (RML), finding some evidence that RML affected spatial arbitrage and crop 
grading, but that the magnitude of these effects is small and does not significantly affect farmers’ other 
practices or the price farmers receive. As small-scale producers in these contexts, farmers may be 
limited in their ability to access more profitable points of sale, and have low market power in 
relationship to intermediaries. Though farmers changed their behavior, there were on average no profit 
gains for farmers. In a multi-stage experiment designed to understand competition in rural Kenyan 
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maize markets, Bergquist (2017) empirically demonstrates that low levels of competition among 
collusive traders lead to an estimated 15% reduction in total welfare. An intervention to introduce small 
numbers of new traders to local markets had a limited impact on prices, as new traders were 
incorporated into local traders’ collusive arrangements. Bergquist attributes traders’ market power to 
startup costs, a barrier to entry that limits the number of traders, who then collude to pay below-
competitive prices to farmers and charge above-competitive prices to consumers. These findings suggest 
that more fundamental changes that truly unlock new output market options may be needed to enhance 
competition in such markets. Ghani and Reed (2017) find that increased competition among ice 
manufacturers in Sierra Leone “leads to substantial improvements in fishermen’s productivity and 
reductions in the consumer price of fish.”  
 
However, members of value chains who can act on price information can use price information services 
to access benefits. The introduction of mobile phones in the Kerala fishing industry dramatically reduced 
price dispersion and waste, and increased fishermen's profits by 8% and consumer surplus by 6% 
(Jensen 2007). An innovative procurement strategy that introduced internet kiosks to provide an 
alternative marketing channel with access to a private buyer, price information, and warehousing 
services in Madhya Pradesh increased market prices of soya by 1-3%, reduced price dispersion, and 
increased the area under soy cultivation (Goyal 2010). Quasi-experimental measurement of the effects 
from improved mass-communication to share price information also show some evidence of reduced 
price dispersion. In Niger, the introduction of mobile phones from 2001-2006 led to an estimated 10-
16% reduction in grain price dispersion, primarily through reduced search costs, with the effect 
stronger for market pairs with higher transportation costs, and when a large percentage of markets have 
mobile phone coverage (Aker 2010). Svensson and Yanagizawa-Drott (2009) estimate that providing 
market price information on maize via FM radio increased farmgate prices by 15% in Uganda. “They 
show that farmers with better access to commodity price information via radio are able to bargain for 
higher prices. They exploit variation in access to radio signals in a difference in difference analysis. In 
their setting, farmers sell surplus production to traders and receive better farmgate prices if they have 
better access to information” (Jack 2013). 
 
More research is needed to understand how increasing farmers’ access to deeper output markets may 
reduce excessive price risk, open opportunities to improve farmer profits and welfare, while triggering 
technology adoption. One such competition-enhancing approach facilitating market linkages is currently 
being evaluated in an experiment in Uganda (Bergquist and McIntosh, in progress). 
 
2. Quality certification is an important contracting problem: Quality certification is a contract 
enforcement problem that is key to the functioning of both input supply chains and output markets. For 
example, even where inputs may be present at local agro-dealers, concerns about poor-quality inputs 
may depress technology adoption where regulatory bodies are missing that certify quality and dis-
incentivize the sale of faulty or fraudulent products. Bold et al. (2017) was motivated by common 
anecdotes in Uganda about poor quality fertilizer and seeds. They collected data to understand the 
magnitude of the problem, revealing empirically that agricultural inputs sold at the retail level in Uganda 
are often ‘fake’ or of very poor quality -- the vast majority of fertilizer samples were substandard, and 
very few of the allegedly improved seeds showed success in producing large crops on test plots (Bold et 
al. 2017). Farmers’ choices were “much more rational than reflexive rejection of modern techniques,” 
demonstrating an important factor contributing to Uganda’s extremely low fertilizer adoption rates 
(6.6%, LSMS-ISA).  
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Technology-driven quality rating systems can work to deepen information and improve incentives in the 
input supply chain. A crowd-sourced ICT clearinghouse (like “Yelp”) that allows smallholders to rate the 
quality of artificial insemination (AI) service providers effectively improved the quality of government 
extension service provision in 
Punjab, Pakistan (Hasanain et al. 
2017, see their Figure 4 at right). 
Small-scale cattle farmers used 
the system to submit ratings and 
understand others ratings and 
prices to bargain with vets. The 
system effectively decreased 
prices and increased service 
quality (27% higher insemination 
success), without needing to 
switch service provider; in fact 
farmers were 33% more likely to 
return to a government 
veterinarian than switch to a 
private provider. These effects are concentrated on lower ranking vets, who tend to serve more distant 
farmers. By decreasing information asymmetry, the clearinghouse system led to AI success 
improvements that were on average equivalent to an additional 50% of one month's median income in 
this context, a 300% return on the cost of the program. 
 
Disorganized output supply chains with multiple intermediaries may fail to properly recognize, 
incentivize, and certify quality, and as a result, opportunities for farmers to add value are lost. There are 
limited incentives for producers to invest in higher quality production, particularly on dimensions that 
are unobservable, if buyers and producers do not trust each other and reputation-building is a 
challenging and low-return investment (Fafchamps et al. 2008) (Bai 2017). Farmers seem to be most 
strongly rewarded by the quantity and directly observable characteristics of what they sell, rather than 
the quality, so external verification may be needed to encourage specific agronomic or other quality-
enhancing production practices (Bernard et al. 2017; Hoffmann et al. 2013; Saenger, Torero, and Qaim 
2014). Important quality markers may be unfamiliar to farmers, or difficult to observe or costly to 
verify. On the consumer side, the domestic food supply faces related quality control issues. Failure to 
resolve these can be detrimental to consumer health. An important example with critical health 
implications is facilitating profitable output market access to smallholders to reduce the prevalence of 
the invisible carcinogenic Aflatoxin fungus (Hoffmann et al. ongoing). 
 
To make the transition to higher-value crop (HVC) production, specific market reform and information 
may be necessary to trigger related technology adoption. Bernard et al. (2017) find that small 
improvements in product market functioning, in this case third party quality certification, can trigger 
technology adoption among onion farmers, increasing the quality of domestic production in Senegal. 
However, market regulation would be needed to sustain these benefits given the shift was met with 
resistance from intermediary traders with market power. Further along the supply chain in retail 
markets in a major Chinese city, Bai (2017) introduces laser-cut labels as a less counterfeit-susceptible 
quality certification method for small-scale watermelon sellers. Sellers with this laser-cut branding on 
average provided higher quality melons (measured by sweetness) and “earned 30-40% higher sales 
profits on average as a result of both higher prices and higher total sales” (Bai 2017). This demonstrates 
demand for reliable quality signals by consumers; widely-used and counterfeit-susceptible stickers did 
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not result in statistically significant higher quality melons nor sales improvements. However, these 
individual sellers did not sustain the expensive laser branding, reverting back to baseline conditions 
indicating they lacked sufficient incentive to invest in the laser branding technology themselves (Bai 
2017). 
 
Revenue streams from HVCs suggest the potential for related contracts and means of production to 
increase rural productivity and profits. Casaburi and Reed (2017) conducted an RCT supplemented 
with quasi-experimental methodology in cocoa markets in Sierra Leone to show that even if information 
about crop quality passes credibly through the value-chain, smallholders may not benefit along their 
profit margin under certain contract conditions or other relationships with intermediaries (in this case 
pass-through was apparent through increased access to credit). Contracts or market regulation that are 
reliable and incentive-compatible are needed to insure smallholders against price risk while creating the 
right incentives for farmers to invest in the production of HVCs. Future research should investigate 
which types of contracting arrangements induce farmers to adopt HVCs and generate maximum surplus 
on both sides of the contract. 
 
3. Intermediaries provide interlinked services; interventions aiming to shift market 
relationships can produce important, unanticipated effects: Existing intermediary 
relationships may be attractive to smallholders because well-informed local traders can interlink a 
variety of agricultural services in a single relationship. In Sierra Leone, palm oil producers were hesitant 
to break relationships with traders by storing harvests to reap larger benefits (Casaburi et al. 2014). In 
focus groups, farmers reported that they found it difficult to break existing relationships with traders 
(who would prefer to buy at harvest time, when prices were low). This is evidence that established 
relationships with traders can reduce the likelihood that producers seek alternate, even potentially more 
profitable, output market options. 
 
Intermediaries can stand-in for otherwise missing financial service providers. In Kenya, dairy farmers 
preferred to sell to cooperatives and receive smaller, bulked payments as a form of savings rather than 
sell to traders and receive daily payments (Casaburi and Macchiavello 2016). In Sierra Leone, cocoa 
market traders build committed relationships with producers through credit provision. Cocoa quality 
premiums from export markets aren’t passed through to producers via better prices, but credit 
provision increases (Casaburi and Reed 2017). Ghani and Reed (2017) also see a previously 
monopolistic ice manufacturer extend trade credit particularly to loyal fishermen customers in response 
to an increase in new ice manufacturer competition that would reduce fishermen’s incentives to remain 
loyal to the supplier (i.e. reduced supply risk). Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) use quasi-
experimental methods to understand relational contracting in Rwanda’s coffee sector, finding that 
increased competition among mills reduced pre-harvest service provision to farmers given anticipated 
reduction of post-harvest loyalties, for example increasing default risk on credit services.  
 
The evidence demonstrates how producers’ relationships with market intermediaries can involve 
services that should not be overlooked. These services may be provided at the expense of 
intermediaries, who may themselves be operating with limited profit margins (Casaburi, Reed and 
Dillon 2017). More research is needed to understand these dynamics as ongoing policy efforts aim to 
change market structures to benefit the rural poor. 
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LOOKING FORWARD 
Field experiments that generate rigorous evidence on the role of input and output markets on smallholders’ 
technology adoption, productivity, and profitability have been limited to date. Consensus on the evidence base in 
this area seems premature, and ATAI plans to commission additional pilots and randomized evaluations to 
contribute to the remaining open questions reviewed in this section. Related takeaways for policy and future 
research are integrated in the overall conclusion below. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Productivity-enhancing technological interventions do not subsequently see widespread adoption in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and parts of South Asia, demonstrating that the adoption puzzle has not been “solved.” But what have we 
learned from field experiments thus far about the binding barriers to agricultural technology adoption and how to 
overcome them? 
 
Smallholder farmers in rainfed contexts face a range of different challenges to technology 
adoption that limit the modernization of agriculture. High transport costs due to bad infrastructure 
drive up the price of inputs and down the price of outputs, reducing the set of technologies that can profitably be 
adopted in remote locations. Variation over time (weather, prices, financial/life events) and space (soil 
chemistry, microclimates, distance from market hubs, etc.) influence investment decisions and resulting 
productivity and profits, but these factors can be difficult for smallholders to observe, manage, or predict. 
 
Risk mitigation is key for supporting smallholders in rainfed contexts, but solving risk 
constraints within agriculture is difficult. Commercial index insurance targeted directly at farmers is 
unlikely to solve the problem given the lack of demand. Future efforts will need to test alternate approaches to 
insurance, whether by creating more sophisticated indexes, providing subsidized policies as a form of social 
protection, or selling insurance at the meso-level to financial institutions to function as a re-insurance. 
Comprehensive risk protection solely through improved seed variety adoption occurs rarely. Future research 
should focus on risk mitigation approaches that use different instruments to collectively address a range of types 
and severity of risk across landholders and laborers, combining the benefits of specific risk-mitigating crops, 
emergency loans, and other risk protective financial products where they’re needed. 
 
Formal credit markets appear too high-risk and low-return to develop in a way that reaches 
smallholders without supportive investments in creative, targeted product design and financial 
institutions. Targeting farmers’ liquidity by introducing standard formal credit and savings interventions is 
typically met with low take-up. Farmers may already have informal credit they can access for agricultural 
investments when better protected from risk; this shows how risk mitigation and formal credit are interrelated 
and should be tackled in tandem. Experiments have identified promising ways to use information, timing, and 
new types of collateral to unlock credit where liquidity is constraining investment. Where credit and savings 
products are carefully designed to meet smallholders’ needs, those who take them up change their agricultural 
practices, though on average it is uncommon and difficult to detect improved profits. 
 
Behavioral economics provides an important product design lens for credit, savings, insurance, 
and information interventions. When designing products and services to support smallholder farmers, 
considering the behavioral biases that may be hampering agricultural decision-making over long time-frames 
characterized by uncertainty and risk can inform effective product design. Low-cost product design features like 
nudges, reminders, or commitment devices have been shown to support smallholders’ decision-making. 
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Heterogeneous agro-ecological and market conditions mean that in many contexts, not all 
farmers have the necessary complementary factors to reap returns from a particular technology. 
Supply-side constraints should not be overlooked, especially in contexts where reliable access to quality, context-
attuned technologies is uncertain. Heterogeneity of circumstances and limited social connections can also hamper 
access to and learning about new technology. Improved extension may be critically important for new technology 
adoption, especially when a technology is not readily understood or will have a wide range of outcomes that are 
context-dependent. 
 
New information is only useful to the degree that it is both novel and profitably actionable, and 
business-as-usual extension is often ineffective. Falling information costs and improved 
communication technology provides a number of entry points for new interventions that 
provide novel, timely, tailored, or high-frequency information to market participants. Improved 
extension systems should align the incentives of public and private input agents and contact farmers. More 
timely, accessible, and tailored information, provided by leveraging ICT tools, and carefully selected entry points 
for new information and inputs can encourage the spread and inclusivity of information and related technologies. 
 
Telecommunications are now sufficiently widespread that additional impact from price 
information interventions on the margin may be small. There does appear to be some efficiency 
created by price notification systems, however, and if their price is small this may be a welfare-
enhancing intervention. Price information alone is unlikely to be enough for producers to access more 
profitable points of sale, although there is evidence that sharing price information can lead to the convergence of 
prices across markets with welfare benefits for farmers. 
 
Small-scale producers often lack sufficient and sustained incentives to adopt productivity- or 
quality-enhancing technologies under current output market structures. There is scope to use 
technology to improve contracting and enhance the flow of information, but scaling research 
studies to durable institutional models is difficult. Relationships with intermediaries vary across 
contexts, and the nature of these relationships, in addition to the costs of doing business, affect how value chains 
are structured and whether and how favorable prices or other benefits pass-through to producers. There is work 
to be done to understand the costs of infrastructure, the competitiveness of value chain intermediaries, the 
potential for contract farming and other market linkage arrangements, and how value chain actors respond to 
market reforms such as crop-quality and pricing in supply chains. 
 
MOVING BEYOND THE ADOPTION PUZZLE TO AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION 
 
This body of rigorous evidence provides valuable insights for those who aim to increase agricultural technology 
adoption among smallholder farmers. The individual randomized evaluations that make up this summary are 
convincing for their ability to identify causal relationships with clean internal validity. This methodological rigor 
makes these field experiments a useful and important tool to understand “what works” for farmers who face these 
particular constraints. An equally valuable role for randomized evaluations, though often overlooked or 
underappreciated, is their ability to identify what does not work -- allowing us to test important hypotheses and 
critically examine common assumptions. 
 
The optimistic cross-cutting conclusion stemming from this rigorous body of evidence is that there is in fact 
potential to induce technology adoption from alleviating a specific binding constraint. When farmers are induced 
to adopt credit or insurance products, or when they are provided with a more saturating information 
environment, they respond by adopting new technologies in greater numbers. These findings highlight the 
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importance of prevalent logistical challenges: quite clearly, the specific mechanism by which credit, insurance, or 
information is delivered has significant influence on its effectiveness. The clear points outlined in the sections 
above offer specific suggestions of promising approaches to improve the demand and the efficacy of credit 
products, risk products, and extension products. 
 
The randomized evaluations reviewed in this chapter typically focus on relaxing one or two specific constraints to 
adoption. While the evidence suggests that relaxing a particular constraint can lead to some additional adoption, 
the fraction of farmers who are induced to adopt new technologies when any of these constraints are lifted is 
small, and the net effects on farm profits smaller still. This suggests that generating slack in any of these particular 
constraints only induces a small number of farmers to adopt, perhaps because alleviating one constraint is only 
effective until a different constraint starts to bind. In other words, while relaxing credit, risk, or information 
constraints can spur technology adoption, adjusting any of these constraints in isolation seems unlikely to be 
transformative for the agricultural sector as a whole. 
 
In part, this reflects the returns on available technologies: many technologies that remain un-adopted and that 
farmers have access to, or which farmers could easily access, may have positive but marginal returns rather than 
individually transformative returns. The relatively low demand for credit products suggests that many farmers do 
not perceive available, as-yet-unobtained technologies to have (risk-weighted) returns larger than the interest 
rate on these loans. In other words, as has been concluded by de Janvry (2016), singularly transformative “silver 
bullet” agronomic technologies do not appear to be available. 
 
If the goal is to induce transformative change, absent the availability of inexpensive and transformative 
technologies, we suggest a related agenda for the frontiers of experimental research on these topics. Building on 
the existing, rich experimental evidence base focused on individual constraints, there is a clear need to evaluate 
interventions which can lift multiple constraints at once. The evidence summarized here has largely stayed away 
from bundled interventions with many moving parts in part due to the complexity of associated evaluation design 
and the challenges in interpreting behavioral mechanisms which respond to a complex product. We suggest that 
experimental researchers may want to focus in particular on the markets and institutions which could allow 
improvements from the adoption of marginal technologies to aggregate into transformative change. 
 
A potentially valuable coordinating mechanism would be interventions in value chains: as value chains are 
strengthened and distributed, input quality becomes more reliable, presumably information costs would decrease 
as would the returns to financial intermediation. Market-level and infrastructure-level constraints may be the 
most binding to transformative effects, yet are the most expensive to alleviate and have thus far been difficult to 
study in the context of RCTs. However, a rise in the use of RCTs and related measurement techniques has 
fortunately broadened the scope of questions that have been creatively tackled while remaining true to the rigor 
of the experimental technique. Rigorous evaluations that can illuminate the functioning of value chains are ripe 
for further innovation, and studies currently in progress and forthcoming from ATAI may illustrate a path 
forward. 
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